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Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and
Retribution1
THOM BROOKS
The duty of philosophy was, rather, to remove the deception aris-
ing from misinterpretation, even at the cost of destroying the
most highly extolled and cherished delusion.2
Introduction
The purpose of this essay is to appraise critically J. Angelo Corlett’s
recent interpretation of Kant’s theory of punishment as well as his
rejection of Hegel’s penology. In taking Kant to be a retributivist at
a primary level and a proponent of deterrence at a secondary level,
I believe Corlett has inappropriately wed together Kant’s distinc-
tion between moral and positive law.
However, while Corlett incorrectly attributes to Kant a mixed
theory of punishment, he also incorrectly attributes to Hegel a
purely retributive theory of punishment. In fact, it is Hegel, not
Kant, that differentiates between retributive and deterrent justifica-
tions for punishment at the primary and secondary levels to which
Corlett subscribes. It is therefore a bit of a surprise to find Corlett
dismissing Hegel’s theory of punishment out of hand. I will
attempt to demonstrate that Corlett should not have done so.
Finally, there is a third minor difficulty with Corlett’s piece. This
problem is the almost timeless retributivist rejection of deterrence-
based theories of punishment—particularly amongst the utilitarians
—on the grounds that the latter somehow would condone in some
cases the punishment of innocent persons. As this is a major objec-
tion for Corlett and many other retributivists, I will briefly search
for a utilitarian that would actually condone the punishment of an
innocent person. It is my contention that nearly all proponents of
utilitarian- or consequentialist-based justifications of punishment
are, in fact, rule-utilitarians with regard to punishment. These
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1 I am responding to J. Angelo Corlett, ‘Making Sense of
Retributivism,’ Philosophy, 76 (2001), 77–110.
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Werner S. Pluhar (trans.)
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, [1781/17987] 1996), 9 [A xiii].
individuals almost always demand that no innocent person be
punished as a rule of the highest order.
Does Kant have a mixed theory of punishment?
In Corlett’s estimation Kant is not a pure retributivist: he is not the
first to make this case.3
For Corlett, the critical passage from Kant about punishment is
[punishment] can never be used merely as a means to promote
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but
instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the
grounds that he has committed a crime; for a human being may
never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of some-
one else ... He must first be found to be deserving of punishment
before any consideration is given to the utility of his punishment for
himself or for his fellow citizens.4
In Corlett’s estimation, Kant is insisting that considerations of
social utility must figure into the justification of the institution of
punishment at a secondary level.5 As Corlett’s Kant finds non-
desert factors relevant to deciding specific retributive punishments
for particular wrong-doers, giving these wrong-doers what they
deserve is not all there is to justice.6
I disagree with Corlett’s statement that he has ‘provided
important textual evidence that even Kant implies that desert is
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3 See Mark Tunick, ‘Is Kant a Retributivist?’ History of Political
Thought, 17 (1996), 60–78.
4 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Roger J. Sullivan, trans-
lator, Mary Gregor (ed.) (Cambridge University Press, [1797] 1996), 105
[6:331]. See Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ 86–7. [Emphasis
given.] When citing all works by Kant, the first number will refer to the
page in the edition cited. In the brackets, the first number refers to the vol-
ume number of the Prussian Academy of Sciences edition of Kant’s works
with the second number after the colon referring to the page number in
this volume where the quotation is found. See Tunick, ‘Is Kant a
Retributivist?’ 60n1.
5 See Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ 87.
6 Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retribution,’ 87. Corlett later states: ‘In tak-
ing Kant seriously the retributivist need not have a difficulty in appealing
to social utility considerations in expounding the concept of desert, both
in justifying the institution and practice of punishment.’ (‘Making Sense
of Retributivism,’ 89.)
insufficient for the justification of, or duty to, punish.’7 For one
thing, Corlett neglects to state the sentence following the above
quotation: ‘The law of punishment is a categorical imperative.’8
Being a categorical imperative, the law of punishment must hold
universally with necessity for all human beings. By universal laws,
Kant refers to the idea of punishing like for like. In performing a
particular action, it is supposed that we are stating to our commu-
nity through our action that all human beings may act the same as
we have.9
An example may help to clarify this important point. When
thieves steal property they set up a universal maxim that all might
take property too. The same goes for murderers: in murdering, the
killer establishes a universal maxim that all might take the lives of
others. For Kant, stealing and murdering—amongst many other
crimes—are wrong in large part because they can not become uni-
versal actions. As these transgressors of the law have wrongfully
subjected the law-abiding public to these harmful actions, Kant
believes it is only fair and just to subject these persons to the harm-
ful maxims they attempted to impose on their community. 
It may not be too surprising then to find that Kant offers many
reasons to consider him a retributivist. For one thing, he was very
critical of the use of punishments as some kind of a tool to realize
future goals.10 For instance, Kantian punishments must always treat
human beings as ends-in-themselves and never a means to some
future goal:
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7 Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ 103.
8 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 105 [6:331].
9 In large part, Hegel shares this view. See G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of
the Philosophy of Right, Allen W. Wood (ed.) and H. B. Nisbet (trans.)
(Cambridge University Press, [1821] 1991), 49 [§15 Addition]; 113 [§81,
Remark]; 115–116 [§82, Addition]; 124–125 [§99, Remark]; 126–127 [§100,
Remark]; and 131–132 [§104]. See op. cit., 117–118 [§86, Addition] and
104 [§73].
10 ‘But to look upon all punishments and rewards as mere machinery in
the hands of a higher power, serving only to put rational beings into activ-
ity toward their final purpose (happiness) is so patently a mechanism
which does away with the freedom of their will that it need not detain us
here.’ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Mary Gregor (ed.
and trans.) (Cambridge University Press, [1788] 1997), 35 [5:38]. See
Kant’s essay ‘The End of All Things’ in Immanuel Kant, Religion within
the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (eds)
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 204 [8:338–339].
Punishment by a court (poena forensis) ... can never be inflicted
merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal
himself or for civil society. It must always be inflicted upon him
only because he has committed a crime.11
Kant clearly opposes the idea of using punishments as a means of
social engineering. He is particularly adverse to the idea that pun-
ishment ought to make an example of the punished to the law-abid-
ing community. The importance of a human being—solely on the
basis that one is, in fact, a human being—must always be taken into
account when determining appropriate punishments. For Kant, this
means that when we punish a criminal, we must do so in a manner
that takes little, if any, into account of how the punishment might
affect others besides the criminal being punished. This is squarely
at odds with Corlett’s presentation of Kant’s penal theory.
A perceptive commentator on Hegel and Kant’s theories of
punishment, Mark Tunick says that
[p]erhaps the most striking illustration of a retributivist position,
in this case one that appears to be entirely backward-looking and
oblivious to consequences, is found in a passage written by
Immanuel Kant.12
Tunick goes on to cite from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals:
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all
its members (e.g., if a people inhabiting an island decided to
separate and disperse throughout the world), the last murderer
remaining in prison would first have to be executed, so that each
has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not
cling to the people for not having insisted upon this punishment;
for otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators in this
public violation of justice.13
In this example, members of this civil society have a necessary duty
to execute murderers before dissolving their social contract. While
all other debts might or might not be forgiven and all other con-
tracts left unfulfilled, it is only with punishing violent criminals
where we are commanded to treat them both severely and strictly.
The importance given to punishing violations of justice over other
concerns is not a minor matter for Kant: ‘if justice goes, there is no
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11 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 105 [6:331]. [Emphasis given.]
12 Tunick, ‘Is Kant a Retributivist?’ 60.
13 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 106 [6:333]. See Tunick, ‘Is Kant a
Retributivist?’ 60n1.
longer any value in human beings’ living on the earth.’14 Indeed,
some of our meaning and value as persons derive, in part, from our
sacred defence of justice in human community.
It must be said that it is rather difficult to reconcile Kant’s motto
of equity (‘the strictest right is the greatest wrong’) with this insis-
tence that all murderers are to be killed as punishment for killing
someone else.15 Yet against this motto, Kant holds that
whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the
people, you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult
yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you
strike him, you strike yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself.16
Indeed, with regard to executing murderers, Kant in fact argues for
‘the strict law of retribution’ in ‘[t]his fitting of punishment to the
crime.’17 This is justified on the grounds that strict justice is not
objectionable in the least when the criminal’s inner wickedness is
particularly noticeable.18
One aspect of Kantian punishment that is little mentioned in the
literature is the fact that, for Kant, punishment is a physical harm,
properly understood.19 Psychological punishments or non-painful
punishments are not seriously considered for most varieties of
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14 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 105 [6:332].
15 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 27 [6:235]. Perhaps this apparent prob-
lem is best understood in light of the era in which Kant lived. Certainly,
we can expect that the vast majority of ethical theories being developed at
that time by political philosophers would allow for the state execution of
what we would call today first-degree murderers. Despite his notoriety,
even Cesare Beccaria favoured capital punishment in certain instances:
Beccaria finds ‘necessity’ for executing a citizen—even though the citizen
is a member of a social contract—if his or her death ‘was the only real way
of restraining others from committing crimes.’ (Cesare Beccaria [Cesare
Bonesana, Marquis di Beccaria], Henry Paolucci (trans.) On Crimes and
Punishments (New York: Library of Liberal Arts/Bobbs-Merrill, [1764]
1963), 46.)
16 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 105 [6:332].
17 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 106 [6:332].
18 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 106–107 [6:333]. See 107 [6:334]. Other
interesting examples involve Kant’s suggested punishments for rape,
pederasty, and bestiality. Op. cit., 130 [6:363].
19 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 34 [5:37]. Ernest van der Haag
shares this view: ‘punishment must, whenever possible, impose pain
believed to exceed the pain suffered by the individual victim of the crime.
No less is deserved.’ (‘Refuting Reiman and Nathanson,’ Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 14 (1985), 167.
crime.20 In fact, physical infliction of punishment upon a criminal is
a necessary consequence in the allocation of justice, even if the
criminal transgression precipitating the punishment is not natural-
ly connected with moral wickedness.21 The criminal ‘pays’ for the
crime she committed by experiencing a certain amount of, poten-
tially lethal, pain.22
When I mention how Kant finds pain necessary to punishment,
I do not wish to imply that Kant was some kind of sadist—to be
clear, he was certainly not. In fact, he finds rewards offered to the
public by the government to be ‘more in harmony with morality’
than punishments.23
Was then Kant a retributivist? There seems to be a second con-
flicting account we can give of Kant’s theory of punishment. He
was also a proponent of deterrence as a justification for punishment.
He is quite explicit in stating that governments can and do only
impose deterrent punishments.24 This is true because, for Kant, gov-
ernments are primarily concerned with pragmatic matters, rather
than with justice per se. On this view, retributive punishments are
only to be ‘imposed by a being who is guided by moral standards.’25
This would imply that theories of deterrence might be at times
immoral in character and inadequate in some way when compared
with theories of retribution. Oddly, the tables seem to have turned
suddenly: if governments in Kant’s view only impose deterrent
punishments, then any Kantian theory of punishment must be
beholden to deterrence, not retribution, as the main justification for
punishing.
One example ignored by nearly all commentators on Kant’s
theory of punishment is the fact that in certain instances no pun-
ishment should be inflicted, even where the guilty parties deserve to
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20 There is an exception for crimes where the appropriate manner of pun-
ishing criminals is to levy fines. Moreover, wealthy criminals who will not
be ‘hurt’ by the fine are to be publicly embarrassed, perhaps a form of psy-
chological punishment. (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 106 [6:332].)
21 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 34–5 [5:37].
22 See Tom Sorell, Moral Theory and Capital Punishment (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1987), 134.
23 Immanuel Kant, Lecture on Ethics, Louis Infield (trans.)
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, [1930] 1963), 57.
24 Kant, Lecture on Ethics, 55. This statement mirrors Fichte’s belief
that the purpose of punishment is solely to deter. (See J. G. Fichte,
Foundations of Natural Right, Frederick Neuhouser (ed.), Michael Bauer
(trans.) (Cambridge University Press, [1795–1796] 2000.), 226–248 [§20].)
25 Kant, Lecture on Ethics, 55.
be punished.26 In the ‘Doctrine of Right,’ Kant supposes that we
have before us murderers and their accomplices. The idea of judi-
cial legal authority, which I will touch on shortly, dictates that all of
these persons must be executed in accordance with universal laws.
Interestingly, Kant states that should the number of criminals be so
great a number that the state would be left without any subjects if
these persons were all executed,
the sovereign must also have it in his power, in this case of neces-
sity (casus necessitatis), to assume the role of judge (to represent
him) and pronounce a judgment that decrees for the criminals a
sentence other than capital punishment, such as deportation,
which still preserves the population.27
While we had seen that, for Kant, punishments were to be calibrated
and distributed to guilty persons as ends-in-themselves, we now
discover that this does not hold absolutely. 
It would have been interesting to see Kant follow this pro-
nouncement with an alteration of his ‘blood guilt’ scenario. Suppose
he asked us to imagine a small island community which housed a
condemned murderer in its only prison. Instead of wishing to
disband their community irrespective of the fate of their sole
murderer, imagine that the community earnestly threatens their
leader by promising to abandon the island and leave the sovereign
without subjects if he chose to execute the condemned prisoner. We
saw before that Kant would demand that the prisoner be killed, oth-
erwise the community shares in the guilt of his crime. In light of the
above passage, however, it appears that—blood guilt or not‚—the
sovereign ought to alter or annul the condemned prisoner’s sentence
when the consequences of acting otherwise would be terminating
the community. 
Kant gives us several more reasons to suppose that the purpose of
penal laws is primarily to deter. The more well known example he
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26 I know of only three treatments: B. Sharon Byrd, ‘Kant’s Theory of
Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in its Execution,’ Law
and Philosophy, 8 (1989), 196, 196n144; Don Scheid, ‘Kant’s
Retributivism,’ Ethics, 93 (1983), 268–271; and Tunick, ‘Is Kant a
Retributivist?’ 63. Corlett takes this view only with regard to his own per-
sonal theory of punishment. (‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ 78, 78n7.)
He believes his theory of punishment ‘emulates Immanuel Kant’s view
that, though desert is what serves as the primary justification of punish-
ment, considerations of social utility may serve as secondary reasons to
punish.’ (Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ 78.)
27 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 107 [6:334].
gives is where two shipwrecked men fight over a raft which will hold
only one of them.28 Should one of the men push the other off the
raft—drowning him—in order to save his own life, the surviving
man is ‘to be morally condemned but not legally punished.’29 Kant’s
reason is 
the punishment threatened by the law could not be greater than
the loss of his own life. A penal law of this sort could not have the
effect intended, since a threat of an ill that is still uncertain (death
by a judicial verdict) cannot outweigh the fear of an ill that is cer-
tain (drowning). Hence the deed of saving one’s life by violence
is not to be judged inculpable (inculpabile) but only unpunishable
(impunible).30
In part, the surviving person was fulfilling his duty to preserve his
own life.31 Kant also argues against punishing mothers who kill their
illegitimate children and soldiers who murder each other in duels on
the same grounds: these persons ought not to be punished for the
punishment would not deter others in committing the same actions
in the future.32
How do we reconcile these two views? For starters, both pictures
differ from the one Corlett presents us with. To reiterate his inter-
pretation of Kant, Corlett’s Kant believes that we () affix crimi-
nality due solely to retributive justifications and then () serve par-
ticular punishments to guilty persons due—at least in part—to con-
sequentialist concerns.
I have offered a starkly different Kant. First, I have demonstrated
that in some instances Kant seems to be concerned solely with ret-
ributive justifications for punishing and for particular punishments.
For example, recall the illustration of the island community about
to dissolve with a murderer left in its prison: the community must
execute the murderer for the sake of justice or otherwise the com-
munity shares in the murderer’s guilt. Second, I have shown that
there are many other instances where Kant seems to justify punish-
ing criminals solely on consequentialist grounds, where if persons
can not be deterred by the threat of punishment they ought not to
be punished at all. One example is Kant’s statement that govern-
ments are solely concerned with punishments that deter.
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28 See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 28 [6:235–236].
29 I take this phrase from Tunick, ‘Is Kant a Retributivist?’ 65. 
30 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 28 [6:235–236]. [Emphasis given.]
31 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 11 [4:397].
32 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 108–109, [6:336–337].
Does Kant even have a sound theory of punishment?33 Which
Kant is the most accurate? Insightfully, Tunick is quite right to
point out that
if deterrence is the guiding consideration in determining what is
a crime, it is hard to see why justice is at stake when we legally
punish, apart from the merely procedural justice of implement-
ing a practice fairly.34
I would propose that the apparent contradiction is due mostly to a
misreading of Kant, for when Kant is writing in favour of one ver-
sion of punishment rather than another he is doing so in very dif-
ferent contexts. 
For Kant, there is a dichotomy of juridical (i.e., positive) law and
moral law. Juridical laws concern themselves solely with external
actions and their conformity to a government’s legislation – which
may or may be rational.35 To follow a juridical law is to act solely in
keeping with the written legislation governing a human community.
When we act in accordance with these laws, we act legally but we
may not always be acting morally.
The moral law is, for Kant, first and foremost expressed in the
categorical imperative, which asserts practical and necessary oblig-
ations on all human beings.36 This imperative commands us to act
only in such a way that our maxim—expressed by our action—can
be a universal law.37 As rational beings, we act within a ‘kingdom of
ends’ whereby we subject ourselves to universal laws at one and the
same time we perform particular actions.38 The significance is that
the moral law ‘governs’ universally over all human beings with
absolute necessity. 
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33 See Jeffrie Murphy, ‘Doe Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?’
Columbia Law Review, 87 (1987), 509–532. At 509 Murphy states ‘I am not
even sure that Kant develops anything that deserves to be called a theory
of punishment at all. I genuinely wonder if he has done much more than
leave us with a random (and not entirely consistent) set of remarks.’ 
34 Tunick, ‘Is Kant a Retributivist?’ 77–78.
35 See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 14 [6:220]. As positive laws may be
irrational, Kant’s argument against the right to sedition or rebellion
against the state may be problematic. See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals,
96–97 [6:320].
36 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 15 [6:222–223]. See op. cit., 19 [6:227]
and Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 5 [4:392].
37 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 15 [4:402] and 31
[4:421].
38 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 41 [4:432] and 42
[4:434]. See op. cit., 40 [4:432].
Most importantly, this law becomes the standard by which we can
judge the moral correctness of our every action. If I steal a piece of
fruit from a vender, what might happen if everyone was allowed to
act likewise? If I refrain from lying, what might happen if others
followed suit? By acting in accordance with morality, a human being
can fully exist as an end-in-itself ‘since only through this is it pos-
sible to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends.’39
From a purely moral perspective, when we do punish criminals, it
is essential that we first justify the punishment as an act of justice:
‘this constitutes what is essential in this concept [of punishment].’40
In other words, punishment must be primarily commensurable with
justice in order for it to be distributed to a particular person. This
implies that punishment ought to be given only to the guilty and
within certain limits. With regard to the violation of moral laws,
Kant is clearly in favour of retributive measures of punishing trans-
gressors. When we are instead discussing the violation of juridical
(positive) law—as Corlett was—Kant concerns himself primarily
with deterrence-based justifications for punishment. This dichoto-
my is rarely appreciated by commentators on Kant’s political
philosophy.41
Rather confusingly, Kant does suggest that when we violate the
moral law our transgression deserves punishment.42 More specifi-
cally, for Kant, the ‘rightful effect’ resulting from the transgression
of the moral law (the categorical imperative) is ‘punishment
(poena).’43 This may be understood in one of two ways. One inter-
pretation is that persons who violate the moral law ought to be pun-
ished for their violation—punishment is the ‘rightful effect’—but
these persons may avoid being punished.
On the other hand, this apparent problem is perhaps best under-
stood as an argument for the importance of intentionality for the
distribution of punishments. The moral law is particularly con-
cerned with the state of mind and decision-making process of a
human being, whereas the juridical law is particular concerned with
the external actions of a human being independent of the reasons
for acting. As Kant insists: 
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39 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 42 [4:435].
40 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 34 [5:37].
41 The only—and best—treatment of Kant’s theory of punishment is
Tunick, ‘Is Kant a Retributivist?’ 60–78, esp. 77–78. A somewhat similar
dichotomy is present in Hegel. See Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of
Right, 121 [§94 Addition].
42 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 34 [5:37].
43 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 19 [6:227]. [Emphasis given.]
the state of mind of the subject, whether he committed the deed
in a state of agitation or with cool deliberation, makes a difference
in imputation, which has results.44
When punishing, we ought to consider not only the crime commit-
ted, but the ‘inner wickedness’ of the criminal in performing a
transgression of the law.45 While positive laws concern the external
actions of persons primarily—as moral laws especially concern
themselves with the internal thought process of persons—the
nature of a person’s intentions in performing an action in violation
of the positive law is an important factor in attributing punishable
guilt. Those who break these laws deliberately are more culpable for
their criminal action(s) than those who do so unintentionally.46
Of course, we should not always assume that a criminal’s inten-
tionality is united in their criminal actions: only in certain instances
are the two fully connected.47 On some occasions, a criminal action
may well be an unintended consequence. This gap between the per-
ceived—our physical movements—and the unperceived—the state
of our moral disposition—marks the difficulty of this project of
calibrating punishments to persons with regard to their moral guilt.
Kant holds that the concept of right is located ‘directly in the pos-
sibility of connecting universal reciprocal coercion with the freedom
of everyone.’48 Therefore, to act in accordance with the moral law
through the categorical imperative is to act in a manner fully com-
mensurable with right.49 The connection between punishment and
right is explicit: ‘[r]ight and authorization to use coercion therefore
mean one and the same thing.’50 This connection is dependent upon
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44 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 20 [6:228].
45 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 106–107 [6:333].
46 I am referring to the common legal distinctions of actus reus and mens
rea and their often critical importance in attributing punishments to crim-
inals.
47 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 108 [6:335]. See Kant, Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals, 13 [4:399–400] and 19–20 [4:407].
48 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 25 [6:232]. Moreover, the duties of right
are ‘duties for which external lawgiving is possible.’ External lawgiving is
only impossible for duties of virtue. See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 31
[6:239].
49 A society which is not in accord with right is a state of nature, which
society must strive to avoid at all costs. See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals,
85 [6:306] and (‘each may impel the other by force to leave this state [i.e.,
the state of nature] and enter into a rightful condition’) 90 [6:312]. See also
Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 31 [4:421].
50 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 26 [6:232]. See op. cit., 26 [6:234].
the desirability of universalizing specific actions. In concert with
the moral law, if a given action is acceptable under these circum-
stances it is fully in keeping with right, thus giving the presiding
authority the (legal and moral) justification to employ coercion
against persons who perform actions which are non-universalizable.
In addition, Kant does seem to believe that human beings—while
they are subject to the particular laws of their place of residence—
ought to follow the moral law at all times.51 The moral law is not
some utopian ideal we might aspire to, yet never fulfil. Instead, the
significance given to the moral law via reason is that ‘the moral law
is solely practical,’ its realization by human beings is a true possi-
bility and not a product of wishful thinking.52 It is this moral law
which determines the concept of right and wrong, our standard by
which we fine tune legislation in the effort to unite as closely as pos-
sible the human law with the moral law.53
A particularly good illustration is in Kant’s justification of the
penal ‘quandry’ he arrives at in () having established that trans-
gressors of the law ought to be punished according to the dictates of
retribution and () the existence of certain exceptional cases, such
as murdering a fellow soldier in a duel. He says
The knot can be undone in the following way: the categorical
imperative of penal justice remains (unlawful killing of another
must be punished by death); but the legislation itself (and conse-
quently also the civil constitution), as long as it remains bar-
barous and undeveloped, is responsible for the discrepancy
between the incentives of honour in the people (subjectively) and
the measures that are (objectively) suitable for its purpose. So the
public justice arising from the state becomes an injustice from the
perspective of the justice arising from the people.54
We can now fully appreciate what Kant is telling us. From the stand-
point of the moral law, the positive law may well be inadequate.
Indeed, we might best evaluate juridical law via moral law. However,
this is one standpoint. The other standpoint is that of the state which
deals with practical matters of external actions, which it must try to
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51 See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 35–36 [5:38], 70–71 [5:82–4]
and 79 [5:93]; Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 9 [6:215].
52 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 44 [5:50]. See op. cit., 74 [5:86–87]
and Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 42–43 [6:252–253].
53 See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 54 [5:63] and Kant,
Metaphysics of Morals, 16 [6:223–224]. See also Kant’s discussion of pub-
lic right at Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 89 [6:311].
54 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 109 [6:336–337]. [Emphasis given.]
influence. In practical ethical concerns such as actual state legisla-
tion, justice is served when the letter of the law is observed.
In closing, a sovereign which offers pardons to criminals—
whether through reducing or eliminating their sentence—performs
‘injustice in the highest degree.’55 But this is only in relation to the
moral law existing internally in human beings which we can discern
barely and with much difficulty. From the standpoint of juridical
law the sovereign who offers pardons acts justly if this pardon pos-
itively colours certain consequences.
Corlett therefore misinterprets Kant’s entire penal project. Kant
is not retributivist at a primary level and then open to considera-
tions of social utility at a secondary level, that of affixing specific
punishments to particular criminals. Instead, when Kant is arguing
on behalf of retributive- or deterrent-based justifications he does so
from different standpoints. The retributive Kant is concerned with
transgressions of the moral law, the deterrent Kant with juridical
law. Indeed, it is easy to confuse the two as Kant does seem to take
into account moral culpability when determining a criminal’s sever-
ity of punishment. The problem with Corlett’s interpretation, in
my view, is that he confuses these two standpoints when justifying
his own version of proportional punishment.56
Was Hegel a ‘pure retributivist’?
Quite surprisingly, Corlett is very dismissive of Hegel’s theory of
punishment. All he has to say about Hegel is stated in one short
footnote:
A less sophisticated, yet none the less pure, version of ret-
ributivism than that articulated by Rawls is found in G. W.
F. Hegel.57
To add insult to injury, Corlett cites only one paragraph—from
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right—to support his case.58 A quick exami-
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55 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 109 [6:337].
56 As we will soon see in the next section on Hegel’s theory of punish-
ment, I believe that Corlett would have done much better had he depend-
ed upon Hegel as his ideological foundation, rather than Kant.
57 Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ 80n13.
58 See Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ 80n13. The paragraph
he looks at is §100 from G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, F.[sic] M.
Knox (trans.) (Oxford University Press, 1942), 70–1. The translator was,
in fact, Sir T.M. Knox.
nation of what Corlett has cited is revealing. In §100, the paragraph
in question, Hegel mirrors Kant’s idea that criminals ought to be
punished by universal laws:
[the action of a criminal] is the action of a rational being and this
implies that it is something universal and that by doing it the
criminal has laid down a law which he has explicitly recognized in
his action and under which in consequence he should be brought
as under his right.59
But is Hegel a pure retributivist? In his remark to §100, he says that 
apart from these considerations, the form in which the righting of
wrong exists in the state, namely punishment, is not its only
form.60
In other words, it is essential that we punish only guilty persons.
For Hegel, being a criminal consists in acting in a manner that
resists universalizability—not unlike Kant—assuming that the pos-
itive law is fully rational.61 Therefore, our primary consideration of
‘who should be punished’ is easily answered: only the guilty parties.
However, ‘apart from these considerations,’ Hegel specifically states
that the actual form in which we punish a criminal is not strictly ret-
ributive—‘the form in which the righting of wrong exists in the
state, namely punishment, is not its only form’62—and the govern-
ing authority may take extra-retributive justifications for a particu-
lar punishment into account. 
Far more important is the following §101 and its long remark
where Hegel defines retribution:
The annulment of the crime is retribution in so far as (a) retri-
bution in conception is an ‘injury of the injury’, and (b) since as
existent a crime is something determinate in its scope both qual-
itatively and quantitatively, its negation as existent is similarly
determinate. This identity rests on the concept, but it is not an
equality between the specific character of the crime and that of
its negation; on the contrary, the two injuries are equal only in
respect of their implicit character, i.e. in respect of their ‘value’.63
Here Hegel explicitly condemns the usage of ‘like for like’ (i.e.,
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59 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, 70 [§100].
60 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, 71 [§100 Remark].
61 Hegel assumes that over time rationality will be fully commensurable
with what ‘is actual.’
62 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, 70 [§100].
63 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, 71 [§101]. [Emphasis added.]
pure retributive justifications for punishment) and instead argues
for equality of ‘value,’ not equality of ‘kind.’ My claim that this is
most revealing refers to the fact that Corlett’s theory of punishment
aims to make ‘significantly more plausible a [specific] model of
punishment,’64 a version of proportional retributive punishment.65
In Corlett’s brand of punishment, 
punishment is justifiably inflicted on an offender only if it
‘weighs’ the same for the offender on a scale of suffering as the
offense ‘weighs’ (or would ‘weigh’ on such a scale if the victim is
incompetent or dead) to the victim on a scale of suffering.66
Corlett is mistaken in looking for his intellectual forebearer in Kant,
as it is Hegel who offers a theory of punishment that is () propor-
tional in terms of value, () retributivist at the primary level, and
() takes into consideration consequences of social utility when
determining the actual, particular punishment to be implemented.
As Hegel aptly notes, the ‘identity’ of a crime and retributive
punishment in kind is ‘not an equality in the specific character of
the infringement.’67 This is to say that while punishments must
befall only the guilty in accordance with the principle that only the
guilty should be punished,68 it must only be, at best, ‘an approximate
fulfilment’ of the precipitating crime.69
To further illustrate Hegel’s clarity on this issue, he says
an insuperable difficulty arises when we come to determine pun-
ishments ... it is very easy to portray the retributive aspect of
punishment as an absurdity (theft as retribution for theft, robbery
for robbery, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, so that one
can even imagine the miscreant as one-eyed or toothless); but the
concept has nothing to do with this absurdity, for which the intro-
duction of that [idea of] specific equality is alone to blame ...
[E]quality remains merely the basic measure of the criminal’s
essential deserts, but not of the specific external shape which the
retribution should take. It is only in terms of this specific shape
that theft and robbery [on the one hand] and fines and imprison-
ment etc. [on the other] are completely unequal, whereas in terms
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64 Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ 110.
65 See Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ 94–95.
66 Corlett, Making Sense of Retributivism,’ 95.
67 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 127 [§101]. [Emphasis
given.]
68 See Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 127 [§101 Remark].
69 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 128 [§101 Remark].
[Emphasis given.]
of their value, i.e. their universal character as injuries
[Verletzungen], they are comparable.70
So long as the criminal to be punished is, in fact, responsible for her
crime, the weighing of punishments with regard to crimes is not to
be done on a strict nor reciprocal (‘eye for an eye’) basis at all.71 The
person guilty of assault need not be assaulted himself in prison, as
we may employ a variety of different punishments so long as there
is at least ‘comparative’ values between the crime committed and
the punishment allocated. Should we do otherwise, Hegel notes that
we might view the attribution of specific punishments for particu-
lar crimes as arbitrary.72 In fact, how we affix punishments to crimes
is not arbitrary, but rational—although the best manner of acting
may not yet be fully transparent.73
Lastly, Hegel does not consider merely the practice of punish-
ment at his time, but, instead, the shape and force of penal laws
through history:
With the progress of education, however, attitudes toward crime
become more lenient, and punishments today are not nearly so
harsh as they were a hundred years ago. It is not the crimes or
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70 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 128–129 [§101 Remark].
[Brackets and emphasis given.]
71 Of course, the one big exception is with murder: ‘although retribution
cannot aim to achieve specific equality, this is not the case with murder,
which necessarily incurs the death penalty. For since life is the entire com-
pass of existence [Dasein], the punishment [for murder] cannot consist
[bestehen] in a value—since none is equivalent to life—but only in the tak-
ing of another life.’ Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 129–130
§101 Addition. [Emphasis given.]
Perhaps what Hegel should have said is that the lex talionis is an argu-
ment based upon some measure of equivalence. In a sense, it is somewhat
of a coincidence that the most severe crime (i.e., murder)—or, at least, one
of the most severe—is punished by the most severe punishment (i.e., exe-
cution). Hegel could have then argued that he is not making any special
exceptions in this instance, as he would not be justifying his position on the
basis that no punishment other than death would be appropriate for mur-
derers. The equivalency between a murderer and his punishment would
then only be in value, not in kind. The biggest drawback to this argument
is the fact that Hegel never offers it. If he had, his argument for capital
punishment would have been more consistent. I am indebted to Brian
O’Connor for this insight.
72 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 129 [§101 Addition].
73 A fully transparent method would be available in a completely
rational system of matching punishments with particular crimes.
punishments themselves which change, but the relation between
the two.74
For Hegel, there is no absolute standard by which we may affix
punishments to crimes. We do this task in virtue of values we
attribute to the harm created by a crime versus the appropriateness
of a punishment for the crime in question. The values we assign
both the crime and the punishment are given to fluctuation over
time, in large part due, for Hegel, to the expansion and improve-
ment of education.
The upshot is that Hegel’s theory of punishment accounts for
qualitative calibrations of punishments for particular crimes. In addi-
tion, these attributions are far from absolute and are given to change
over time. The sole criteria by which we choose which punishment to
inflict is the punishment’s approximate fulfilment of some value,
derived from how we assess the original harm created by a crime. 
If I were to mention only one paragraph from Hegel’s Philosophy
of Right as a complete summary of his views on punishment—
which I would not do75—I might choose §99 where Hegel says:
The various considerations which are relevant to punishment as a
phenomenon [Erscheinung] and to its relation [Beziehung] to the
particular consciousness, and which concern its effect on repre-
sentational thought (as a deterrent, corrective, etc.), are of essen-
tial significance in their proper context, though primarily only in
connection with the modality of punishment. But they take it for
granted that punishment in and for itself is just.76
It is quite clear that, for Hegel, there is a primary consideration of
justice: is the person under consideration of being punished for a
transgression of the law actually guilty of the act? If the answer is
‘yes,’ we may then affix any number of punishments—within a
given range determined by roughly equivalent values of
punishments for crimes—whether they be retributive, deterrents,
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74 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 123 [§96 Addition].
75 Through out this discussion I have almost without exception stuck
with the small third section of ‘Abstract Right,’ in Hegel’s Philosophy of
Right, entitled ‘Wrong.’ This is not the only section in the Philosophy of
Right where Hegel discusses punishment, nor the only work—in particu-
lar, there are rich discussions of punishment in Hegel’s Natural Law and
System of Ethical Life. I have avoided these works—as Corlett has—to
demonstrate only that what he did not avoid (i.e., The Philosophy of Right)
was particularly assessed inaccurately. 
76 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 125 [§99 Remark].
[Emphasis given.]
reformative, etc. In this sense, Hegel is more than just a progressive
ahead of his contemporaries. He offers a superb foundation from
which to build any retributive-based theory of punishment which
takes social utility considerations into account when affixing
particular punishments as Corlett’s theory of punishment does. 
Do Utilitarians Punish Innocent People? 
The standard objection raised against utilitarian justifications of
punishment by retributivists is that it might permit punishing inno-
cent persons. Corlett is no exception in this regard.77 Even when so-
called rule-utilitarian/consequentialists such as John Rawls claim
that ‘utilitarians agree that punishment is to be inflicted only for the
violation of law,’78 this assurance is not enough to satisfy Corlett:
Could not utilitarianism justify, in principle, the one-time and
‘minor’ punishment of an unknown individual (a person beyond
society’s purview of concern) who is innocent?79
One distinction I like to make is between ‘naive utilitarianism’ and
‘classical utilitarianism.’ ‘Naive utilitarianism’ refers to what I
believe is a misperception of utilitarianism. This view is most infa-
mous for permitting the punishment of innocent people. On the
other hand, ‘classical utilitarianism’ refers to Jeremy Bentham’s
version of utilitarianism.
I would argue that nearly all utilitarians are rule- or act-utilitari-
ans in one guise or another. For nearly all utilitarians, as a rule, there
is a prohibition against punishing innocent people.80 In fact, I would
go so far as to say that it is rather challenging to come up with util-
itarians who would permit the practice.81
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77 See Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ 77, 83–4. Other com-
mentators who make the same error are Igor Primoratz, Justifying Legal
Punishment (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1989), 61 and Sorell,
Moral Theory and Capital Punishment, 64. This reading is addressed in my
‘Utilitarianism, Capital Punishment, and Innocent Persons,’ Review
Journal of Philosophy & Social Science (forthcoming).
78 John Rawls, Collected Papers, Samuel Freeman (ed.) (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1999), 24. See Corlett, ‘Making Sense of
Retributivism,’ 83n20.
79 Corlett, ‘Making Sense of Retributivism,’ 83–4.
80 See Jeffrie Murphy, Kant: The Philosophy of Right (London:
Macmillan, 1970), 141 and Tunick, ‘Is Kant a Retributivist?’ 68, 68n44.
81 Only two come to mind: Thomas Hobbes and Cesare Beccaria (in
emergency cases where punishing an innocent person is the only thing that
would keep the state intact).
Utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and John
Stuart Mill—as well as consequentialists like Rawls—all state that a
person must be guilty of a crime to be legally punished.82
Unfortunately, few scholars accept this as true. For example, Igor
Primoratz tends to read into Bentham that all utilitarians, on
Bentham’s account, ought to commit themselves to punishing inno-
cent people when it ‘is the alternative with the best consequences
attainable.’83 On this reading, punishment ought only to be given
when it is useful: a punishment’s usefulness serves as its sole justi-
fication.84
In a move in step with much of the popular perception of utili-
tarianism, Primoratz extends, quite unfairly, this characterization of
Bentham’s theory of punishment to all utilitarians:
A utilitarian is immune to this sense of the tragic and to the feel-
ing of guilt which brings it about. From her point of view, when-
ever the balance of consequences favours ‘punishing’ the inno-
cent, that is all there is to it, morally speaking; so one should
‘punish’ them and feel no compunction.85
I believe that Primoratz is basing his allegation on a fictional straw
man called naive utilitarianism. Bentham’s utilitarianism, for
instance, is much to the contrary. Without any turn towards some
kind of majoritarian calculus, Bentham holds that those who prose-
cute innocent people for crimes they did not commit are wrong.86
Bentham argues that all the penal law is concerned with doing ‘is to
measure the depravity of the disposition where the act is mischie-
vous.’87 Such a disposition does not exist in innocent people. 
Punishment is an evil, for Bentham.88 And as an evil, there are
only certain conditions which would warrant its use. There are four
limits that Bentham puts upon all punishments. Bentham’s first
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82 For example, see James Mill, Essays on Government, Jurisprudence,
Liberty of the Press, and Law of Nations (New York: Augustus M. Kelly
Publishers, [1825] 1967), 16–7 in ‘Jurisprudence’ and 4 in ‘Liberty of the
Press; John Stuart Mill, ‘Speech in Favour of Capital Punishment,’ in
Peter Singer (ed.) Applied Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1986), 102–3;
and Rawls, Collected Papers, 24. I will give a full defence of Bentham
below.
83 Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, 25.
84 Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, 26.
85 Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, 61.
86 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation (Darien: Hafner Publishing, [1780] 1970), 93–4.
87 Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 142.
88 Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 170.
limit is that punishments are not to be groundless.89 That is to say that
where there is no wrongdoing or evil to prevent, there is no reason to
punish. Groundless punishment can also be a punishment which has
caused some degree of harm to a person or group of persons with,
however, the affected person(s) full consent (volenti non fit injuria).
We might note immediately that Bentham—according to his very
first limitation on punishment—is against punishing someone who is
innocent. It is unclear to me how he could be more explicit.
I see Bentham as a rule-utilitarian as he follows utilitarian calcu-
lative concerns provided that certain conditions have previously
been met. For Bentham to sanction the punishment of someone,
s/he must be guilty of a crime for which s/he is being punished.
It might be objected that I have only demonstrated the fact that
one utilitarian of many would not punish innocent persons. My
reply is simple: if Bentham—the father of classical utilitarianism—
is not guilty of the charge (as well as James Mill, J. S. Mill, and
Rawls),90 what utilitarian is? Corlett’s fear of utilitarians punishing
innocent persons may be due more to a misreading rather than a
substantial worry.
Conclusion
While one of Corlett’s main claims—that retributivism can justify
itself as a practice and as particular acts of a practice—is sound, he
states much that is quite problematic. In particular, I hope to have
demonstrated that while he wished to use Kant as his intellectual
forebearer with regard to his own mixed view of punishment, he
would have been much better off using Hegel, whom he incorrect-
ly dismisses out of hand. In fact, Corlett’s characterization of
Kant’s theory of punishment is hampered by his inability to distin-
guish between Kant’s dichotomy of juridical and moral law.
Instead, Corlett confuses and conflates this dichotomy.
In addition, I hope to have raised questions regarding the categor-
ical denigration of utilitarian- and consequentialist-based theories of
punishment by retributivists on the grounds that the former would
justify the punishment of innocent persons. In fact, we find that few,
if any, such theorists would condone such a move. These theorists
tend to be predominantly rule-utilitarians whose first proposition is
to punish the guilty only. Therefore, Corlett’s fears are ill-placed.
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